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COMMENTARY
German Council on Foreign Relations
How Poland’s  
Postponed Election 
is Boosting  
Opposition Hopes
What was supposed to be a simple 
reelection campaign for President 
Andrzej Duda could be a political 
turning point for Poland. Contrary to 
expectations that authoritative lead-
ers would use the pandemic to con-
solidate power, it exposed the ruling 
party’s vulnerability. The outcome of 
the new elections, which are expected 
to take place in late June or early 
July 2020, is now uncertain. Europe 
should pay attention, because a new 
president could help reconfigure do-
mestic politics and restore Poland’s 
position as a more constructive EU 
partner. 
In early May, just weeks after it entered 
a state of lockdown, Poland decided 
to push ahead with a highly disputed 
election. Amid the global pandemic, a 
postal-only model was proposed. In 
the end, the presidential election was 
called off at the last minute. It became 
clear that in a country of 38 million in-
habitants, a last-minute postal vote 
was logistically impossible. Postpon-
ing the election has averted the worst-
case scenario: a situation in which the 
election result itself could have been 
called into question and triggered Po-
land’s most serious crisis of democra-
cy since it joined the EU, 16 years ago. 
The debacle of the postponed election 
highlighted cracks in the foundations 
of the governing “United Right” coali-
tion, which is built around the national 
conservative Law and Justice (Prawo i 
Sprawiedliwość, PiS) party. In contrast 
to Hungary, where Viktor Orban’s party 
Fidesz holds a constitutional majority 
in parliament, the ruling alliance in Po-
land is not monolithic. It is rather a 
conglomerate of different groupings 
held together by PiS’ leader Jarosław 
Kaczyński. Simply put, the ruling alli-
ance is more fragile than it may seem 
from the outside. 
Developments before May 10 also 
showed that while Kaczyński’s pow-
er in Poland might not be restrained 
by law, it can be curbed by political re-
alities. Last October, PiS lost control 
over the senate after it fell into the op-
position’s hands in the parliamenta-
ry elections. The narrow majority of 
the “United Right” coalition in the Se-
jm hangs by a thread as internal rows 
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between technocrats and hardliners 
threaten to break apart the ruling alli-
ance. It remains to be seen if Kaczyński 
will be able to maintain the balance be-
tween the different groups and hold the 
“United Right” together. Regardless of 
the final result of the presidential race, 
he has a difficult task on his hands. 
A FAILED ELECTION 
BACK ON TRACK
PiS initially wanted to hold the presi-
dential election on May 10 at any cost. 
Even despite the risks connected with 
the coronavirus pandemic and nu-
merous legal and logistical hurdles re-
garding how citizens could safely vote 
without threatening public health. The 
leadership of PiS believed that with 
time, the anticipated economic fall-
out caused by the pandemic could hurt 
Andrzej Duda’s chances for reelection.
But it was not as simple as PiS had 
hoped it would be. Jarosław Gowin, 
the leader of Agreement (Porozumie-
nie), one of Law and Justice’s small co-
alition partners, rebelled against this 
plan, backed up by a handful of MPs 
loyal to him. Because the ruling coa-
lition holds a very slim parliamentary 
majority of only five seats, and be-
cause the PiS leadership failed to con-
vince any of the opposition MPs to 
change sides, Gowin had his way. In 
this political game of chicken, it was 
Kaczyński who swerved first to avoid a 
potentially fatal head-on collision that 
could have broken the ruling coalition 
apart, right before the election.
Polls conducted ahead of May 10 in-
dicated that a significant number of 
opposition voters planned to boy-
cott the election. Therefore, polls in-
dicated that President Duda, backed 
by PiS, would be almost guaranteed 
to secure the presidency in the first 
round by winning more than 50 per-
cent of the votes. More recent polls 
have shown that if the election were 
to be held in normal conditions, the 
current president could count on the 
support of slightly more than 40 per-
cent of the voters. That still places 
Duda on pole position, but raises the 
possibility of a run-off with the lead-
ing opposition candidate. The race for 
the presidency is becoming more and 
more competitive. 
Assuming that the new electoral law, 
which will allow both in-person and 
postal voting, restores the standards 
of a fair and free election, postpon-
ing the vote to early summer could 
have a tremendous impact on the out-
come of the presidential race. The 
postponement of the elections has al-
so brought about important shifts in 
the opposition camp. The biggest op-
position party, the centrist Civic Plat-
form (Platforma Obywatelska, PO), 
has already seized the opportunity to 
swap Małgorzata Kidawa-Błońska, who 
was falling in the polls, for the popular 
mayor of Warsaw, Rafał Trzaskowski. 
Polls are already showing Trzaskowski  
as the front-runner among the oppo-
sition candidates; he is projected to 
win just under 20 percent of the vote. 
Other notable contenders to challenge 
President Duda in the run-off are  
Szymon Hołownia, a former television 
host and Catholic humanitarian activ-
ist with two-digit support, and until 
recently, Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz, 
the dynamic leader of the small  
Christian-democratic Polish Peasants’ 
Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, 
PSL). However, support for Kosiniak- 
Kamysz dropped to single digits after 
Trzaskowski entered the race.  
CLASHING OVER EUROPE
Regardless of which candidate will 
challenge President Andrzej Duda in 
the run-off, it will be a neck and neck 
race as most opposition voters will 
throw their support behind any of  
Duda’s challengers. One of the main 
battlegrounds on which the opposition 
candidate will clash with Duda is Po-
land’s attitude towards Europe. A re-
cent public opinion poll conducted by 
the European Council on Foreign Re-
lations (ECFR) showed that over half 
of Duda’s supporters believe that Pol-
ish values are under threat in the EU, 
and that in today’s world, Poland must 
primarily rely on itself. Meanwhile, as 
many as two-thirds of Civic Platform 
and Polish People’s Party supporters 
want Poland to rely on the EU. In the 
past, President Duda has compared 
Poland’s membership in the EU with 
past occupations by foreign powers. 
Although the three opposition candi-
dates have similar world-views – with 
center-right Trzaskowski being the 
most liberal among them – whichev-
er candidate advances to the run-off 
alongside Duda could have at least a 
medium-term impact on the Polish po-
litical landscape.  
BREAKING WITH THE 
TWO-PARTY SYSTEM?
The Duda-Trzaskowski confrontation 
would be yet another installment of Po-
land’s old and deeply polarizing rivalry 
between the same two political par-
ties. It is a political confrontation that 
has been poisoning Poland for the last 
15 years ever since Lech Kaczyński and 
Donald Tusk competed for the presi-
dency in 2005. But that could change.
Both Hołownia and Kosiniak-Kamysz 
may have the potential to break this 
pattern and bring about some renew-
al of the Polish political system. If one 
of them makes it to the second round, 
it could break the dominant duopoly 
that has characterized Polish politics 
for years and rearrange the landscape 
of Polish political parties. Kosiniak- 
Kamysz, whose supporters mostly hail 
from the countryside, has gained some 
momentum in larger cities. He could 
even attract voters disappointed in 
the ruling party. Hołownia, on the oth-
er hand, is somewhat a political nov-
ice. He fits into a wider phenomenon 
of young political outsiders who cap-
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italize on voters’ fatigue with tradi-
tional political elites. He is capable of 
mobilizing the youth vote, attracting 
voters from different political camps, 
and even reaching out to non-voters. 
For all this, his chances to reach the 
run-off may be undermined by lacking 
a broad and loyal voter base. 
CHANGING OF THE GUARD
All three opposition candidates also 
represent another trend: long over-
due generational change in Polish pol-
itics. Trzaskowski (48), Hołownia (43), 
and Kosiniak-Kamysz (38) signal a 
break from the traditional “old guard” 
of Polish politics. As illustrated by re-
cent developments in neighboring Slo-
vakia, generational change could be 
an emerging regional phenomenon in 
Central Europe as accumulated frus-
tration with blunders and arrogance of 
populist governments act as a boon to 
young leaders and new political forces. 
A potential victory of one of the oppo-
sition candidates would further limit 
the government’s room for maneuver 
and add to the internal fighting in the 
ruling camp. It could even be a tipping 
point that leads to a new parliamentary 
election. 
Although most presidential powers are 
symbolic, the president is still by far 
the most decisive veto-player in the 
Polish political system. His or her ve-
to can be overruled only by a qualified 
majority of three-fifths. This means 
that even if the nationalist conservative 
government of Mateusz Morawiecki 
were to continue in power, it would 
have to find a way to work with a pres-
ident who could safeguard checks and 
balances, challenging the PiS model of 
government more than anything else 
since the election of 2015. Although the 
president’s foreign policy competenc-
es are limited and subordinate to the 
government, the head of state in Po-
land could force domestic politics on-
to a more moderate track and put his 
stamp on foreign policy. 
WHAT IT MEANS 
FOR EUROPE
Postponing the elections in Poland 
helped the country to narrowly avoid a 
spectacular failure and a deep consti-
tutional crisis. It also spares the Euro-
pean Union a serious internal problem. 
The European Commission has already 
launched numerous infringement pro-
cedures including Article 7 over Po-
land’s rule of law and judicial reforms. 
Holding a potentially illegitimate 
election would top all former clash-
es. Postponing the election allows EU 
leaders to prioritize far-reaching de-
cisions about Europe’s economic re-
covery, rather than worrying about its 
fifth largest country challenging the 
EU’s cohesion and values.
With Duda re-elected one should 
not expect any major European pol-
icy shifts as his foreign policy prior-
ities will likely continue to focus on 
transatlantic relations and the Three 
Seas Initiative. But a new Polish pres-
ident might try to act more construc-
tively towards EU partners and seek to 
rebuild and reframe Poland’s participa-
tion in the EU. A new president could 
even herald Poland’s return as a more 
active and constructive partner at a 
time when the future course of EU in-
tegration, amid a pandemic and the 
worst recession of our lifetime, is be-
ing decided.
ARE POLISH VALUES THREATENED IN EUROPE? BY VOTING INTENTION, IN %
TOTAL
Andrzej Duda
Strongly  
disagree
Tend to  
disagree
Neither agree 
nor disagree
Tend to 
agree
Strongly 
agree
Małgorzata Kidawa-Błońska
Szymon Hołownia
Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz
Robert Biedroń
Krzysztof Bosak
Source: 4P research mix (2-12 April 2020, 1,557 respondents). Poll commissioned by ECFR:  
https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_polands_presidential_election_political_chaos_and_divides_on_eur
12 19 23 13
5 13 33 18
26 35 13 11
13 15 24 9
22 23 16 11
21 22 17 8
7 16 36 15
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